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ABSTRACT 
 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND MODERATORS OF WILLINGNESS IN 
INDIVIDUALS WITH SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER AND NON-ANXIOUS 
CONTROLS IN RESPONSE TO A SOCIAL PERFORMANCE TASK 
 
December 2014 
Lauren P. Wadsworth, B.A., Smith College 
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston 
 
Directed by Assistant Professor Sarah Hayes-Skelton 
 
 The present study investigated differences between individuals with social anxiety 
disorder (SAD) and non-anxious controls (NAC) on measures of thought processes and 
anxiety responses surrounding an anxiety-provoking situation. Participants gave a 
spontaneous speech to an audience and reported their anxiety throughout. Measures of 
trait decentering and anxiety, situational anxiety, negative thoughts and believability, and 
willingness to repeat the task were administered. Compared to NAC, individuals with 
SAD reported a higher prevalence of negative thoughts, found the thoughts more 
believable, reported lower levels of trait decentering, and reported less willingness to 
repeat an anxiety-provoking task. Collapsing the groups, we found an inverse relationship 
between the amount of negative thoughts and willingness to repeat the task, and a 
positive correlation between decentering and willingness. We did not find evidence to 
support that decentering and believability moderate this relationship. The present study 
partially supports the proposed model of SAD, as the SAD and NAC groups differed at 
each step of the proposed model, however moderation analyses were not significant.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
SPECIFIC AIMS 
  
 
  
 Over the past few decades, researchers studying social anxiety disorder (SAD) 
have become increasingly interested in the cognitive processes that maintain the disorder. 
Models of SAD suggest that negative feedback loops surround each social and 
performance situation. In these negative feedback loops, individuals expect that a given 
social interaction will go poorly, experience anxiety and negative thoughts during the 
event, interpret their performance as negative, find those negative interpretations very 
believable, and predict that future events will also go unfavorably, leading them to more 
avoidance of and less willingness to engage in future social or performance situations. 
Throughout this loop, individuals experience anxiety before, during, and after social 
encounters or performance situations. The interpretations of each event then serve to 
perpetuate social anxiety. During each stage of the above model, individuals experience 
negative and self-critical thoughts, which are referred to as “maladaptive thoughts” 
(Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). There has been a fair amount of research suggesting that 
maladaptive thoughts maintain SAD symptomology (e.g., Edwards, Rapee, & Franklin, 
2003; Lundh & Sperling, 2002; Mellings & Alden, 2000). In addition, research suggests 
that individuals with SAD find these thoughts more believable than individuals without 
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SAD (Kiko et al., 2012). Therefore, not only do individuals with SAD experience more 
negative thoughts, they also consider these thoughts an accurate representation of their 
performance. Together, these beliefs provide heightened “evidence” that future events 
will also go negatively, which increases behavioral avoidance (a key aspect of SAD) by 
decreasing the individual’s willingness to engage in future social situations.  
On the other hand, little is known about adaptive cognitive strategies that might 
be naturally employed to mitigate the cycle of anxiety. In one adaptive technique, termed 
decentering, individuals step back and evaluate their thoughts and feelings more 
objectively (Safran & Segal, 1990). Such metacognitive cognitive strategies could act as 
a filter, weakening the negative feedback loop, and thus decreasing the anxiety 
experienced by individuals surrounding social and performance situations. This more 
objective interpretation of events might also be linked to reduced avoidance of social 
situations (and greater willingness to engage). Evidence of individuals without SAD 
engaging in more decentering than those with SAD might suggest that naturally engaging 
in such cognitive processes also aids in prevention of SAD. 
 Using a sample of individuals with SAD and those without significant anxiety 
(non-anxious controls; NAC), we evaluated differences in trait and state cognitive 
processes (such as the frequency of negative thoughts, believability of those thoughts, 
and decentering) experienced and employed in relation to a potentially anxiety-provoking 
performance situation in the form of a speech task. In addition, we measured state levels 
of subjective anxiety before and during the task, and willingness to repeat the task 
immediately following its completion.  
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1. To investigate differences in a) maladaptive thoughts experienced during the 
speech task and b) degree of willingness to repeat the task between the SAD 
and NAC groups. 
a) We hypothesized that, consistent with previous research, following the speech 
task individuals with SAD would report higher levels of negative thoughts 
experienced during the task than those in the NAC group. 
b) We also hypothesized that individuals with SAD would report less willingness 
to engage in a similar task in the future compared to the NAC group.  
 
2. Investigate differences in a) decentering, an ameliorative cognitive process 
and b) believability, an exacerbating cognitive process, between SAD and 
NAC groups.  
a) We hypothesized that the NAC group would exhibit higher levels of trait 
decentering compared to individuals with SAD.  
b) Conversely, we hypothesized that the NAC group would report lower levels of 
believability of negative thoughts encountered, suggesting that they may be 
using more advantageous cognitive approaches (i.e., decentering) to anxiety 
provoking situations, giving them a broader perspective regarding negative 
thoughts that arise. 
 
3. Investigate if levels of decentering and/or believability moderate the 
relationship between post-event negative thoughts and willingness to repeat 
task between SAD and NAC groups. 
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a) Collapsing the groups together, we hypothesized that there would be an 
inverse relationship between the amount of negative thoughts and willingness 
to repeat the task and that decentering and believability would moderate this 
relationship, in that when low levels of decentering and/or high believability 
were reported there would be a strong association between negative thoughts 
and willingness, whereas in high levels of decentering and/or low believability 
the relationship would be weakened or absent. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
 
 
 
 Feeling nervous in evaluative or interactive social situations is a normative 
experience (Kiko et al., 2012). However, this anxiety can start causing significant distress 
once it reaches a certain threshold. This threshold has been classified as social anxiety 
disorder (SAD). According to DSM-IV, SAD is characterized by marked and persistent 
fear of negative evaluation during performance situations or social interactions often due 
to fears of poor performance or of showing physical signs of anxiety (American 
Psychological Association, 1994). SAD is a disabling condition that affects 
approximately 12% of the population (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, & Walters, 2005) 
and is associated with higher financial dependency, lower wages, lower educational 
achievement (Heimberg & Becker, 2002), and interference with both romantic and 
platonic relationships (Whisman, Sheldon, & Goering, 2000). 
 
Model of Social Anxiety Disorder 
 Models of SAD suggest that social anxiety is characterized by maladaptive 
cognitions including an increased focus on internal experiences during a social 
interaction or performance, which is followed by negative predictions of future events 
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and then avoidance of specific social situations (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995; Herbert & 
Cardaciotto, 2005; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). These maladaptive cognitions also include 
the individuals’ interpretation of their abilities and performance as largely negative, and a 
comparison of this self-assessment to the suspected interpretation by the audience. These 
maladaptive thoughts occur before, during, and after anxiety provoking events, and work 
together as part of a negative feedback loop to exacerbate, maintain, and/or perpetuate the 
distressing symptoms of SAD.  
In their model, Rapee and Heimberg (1997) break down this negative feedback 
loop into a series of parts that cycle throughout an anxiety-provoking social situation. 
They propose that upon entering the situation, individuals with SAD predict that their 
audience will negatively evaluate them. The audience can be anyone from an authority 
figure with power over their job or education, to a stranger encountered on the street. The 
key is that individuals perceive the other person/people as evaluative. Viewing the 
situation in this context leads the individuals to perceive themselves as performers. When 
this is paired with characteristic negative expectations of ability, individuals view 
themselves as inadequate at such “performances.”  
The prediction and experience of poor performance is imagined to have social 
consequences or losses, such as not making new friends, failure in dating situations, and 
not making gains in work or school. These potential losses then activate a fear response, 
as the event is encoded as socially dangerous. Perceiving a threat in the environment then 
triggers cognitive and physiological manifestations of anxiety, such as activation of the 
autonomic nervous system and increased allocation of attentional resources to the 
environment. Along with physiological symptoms, individuals focus on detecting cues in 
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the environment such as confirmation from the audience that they are performing 
inadequately or displaying visible signs of anxiety. These cues can range from potential 
signs of actual boredom (“audience” yawning) to positive cues (“audience” smiling; 
Laposa, Cassin & Rector, 2010). In either case, the cues are interpreted negatively. For 
example, the audience smiling might be encoded as laughing, thinking the performer is 
stupid. This negative interpretation of the experience then leads to increased negative 
prediction of future performance and likely avoidance of such circumstances, 
perpetuating the cycle. 
The aforementioned steps of the feedback loop lead to cognitive, behavioral, and 
physical symptoms of anxiety. The cognitive symptoms include the maladaptive 
thoughts, like those mentioned above, that confirm the predicted negative performance. 
Behavioral symptoms include avoidance and safety behaviors, or behaviors that usually 
include distancing oneself from the situation, due to being unwilling to engage in anxiety 
provoking situations (Wells, Stopa, & Clark, 1995). Finally, physical symptoms include 
manifestations of autonomic arousal, such as racing heart, sweating, and blushing. These 
physical symptoms are not only uncomfortable to experience, but they also contribute to 
fears that the audience will notice that the individual is experiencing anxiety. According 
to this model, these cognitive, behavioral, and physical symptoms of anxiety confirm the 
individual’s prediction of poor performance, which in turn, exacerbates the symptoms 
and negative interpretation of the situation, completing the cycle, feeding back into the 
loop. 
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Negative Thoughts 
One of the key components of the Rapee and Heimberg (1997) model, and the 
part that we will focus on, is the encoding of negative thoughts and negative self-
evaluation with a specific focus on potential mechanisms through which the self-
evaluations are encoded more and less negatively. Individuals with and without SAD 
experience negative thoughts (Laposa et al., 2010). However, once these negative self-
evaluations reach a certain level, they become overwhelming, characterizing SAD. This 
higher level of symptom severity is partially due to the fact that individuals with SAD 
focus almost exclusively on the negative aspects and cues of a situation, and also find 
them more believable (Kiko et al., 2012). Similarly, when compared to a low social 
anxiety symptom group, individuals with high social anxiety symptoms report increased 
believability of their negative thoughts pertaining to an upcoming anxiety-provoking 
situation (Tanner, Stopa, & De Houwer, 2006). 
It is adaptive to interpret past events, learn from them, and in turn, better plan for 
the future. However, the content of social situational interpretation in individuals with 
SAD is four times more negative than those without SAD (Stopa & Clark, 1993), 
indicating that there is a difference between individuals with and without SAD in their 
interpretation of social events. Thus (like the other symptoms of SAD mentioned above), 
at some level negative thoughts are normative, but high levels of this negativity have 
been associated with clinical levels of SAD (Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Perini, Abbott & 
Rapee, 2006). These higher levels usually include increased negative self-evaluation and 
the ignoring or misinterpretation of cues suggesting successful performance.  
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Theoretically, we could expand the Rapee and Heimberg (1997) model and 
suggest that the extra allocation of attentional resources focusing on cues that confirm the 
individuals’ poor performance self-evaluation hypothesis could exacerbate negative 
thoughts and believability of them. Since individuals with SAD primarily focus on 
negative cognitions (engaging in more negative self-evaluation) and ignore or alter 
positive feedback (Alden, Taylor, Mellings, & Laposa, 2008; Laposa et al., 2010; Clark 
& Arkowitz, 1975; Rapee & Lim, 1992), they are likely engaging in more negative 
interpretations and increased believability of them, leading to more negative expectations 
of future interactions, and in turn lower willingness to re-enter the situation. 
Alternatively, individuals without SAD interpret both positive and negative 
environmental cues, carrying with them a more broadened evaluation of their 
performance, leading to more positive predictions of future events (Laposa et al., 2010). 
Interestingly, these findings do not extend to nonsocial events, suggesting that individuals 
with SAD have a unique set of maladaptive cognitive processes specific to social 
situations (Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; Stopa & Clark, 1993). As described in 
more detail below, this more broadened perspective, in turn, would likely lead to less 
negative pre-event cognitions when approaching the next social situation (i.e., a more 
positive feedback loop).  
Thus, research suggests that individuals with SAD experience a higher proportion 
of negative thoughts (and higher focus on them) than their non-socially anxious 
counterparts, before, during, and in response to social situations. This increase in negative 
thoughts, paired with a higher focus on them, and believability of them (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) likely perpetuates SAD symptoms and decreases 
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willingness. Our research will assess the presence of these negative thoughts, and 
examine what cognitive processes individuals with and without SAD are engaging in that 
may be exacerbating or ameliorating, or filtering the negative cues.  
 
Believability of Negative Thoughts 
 In addition to a higher prevalence of negative thoughts, individuals with SAD also 
interpret their negative thoughts as more believable (Kiko et al., 2012; Tanner et al., 
2006). Believability can be related to more commonly studied construct of fusion, the 
cognitive quality of taking one’s thoughts too seriously (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 
1999) and causing a more narrowed perspective (Eifert et al., 2009; Kocovski, Fleming, 
& Rector, 2009). The danger of fusion or believability, when considered in the context of 
individuals with SAD who tend to interpret largely negative thoughts, is that it will lead 
to a stronger negative association with social interaction and performance situations, 
which will then lead to higher avoidance of such situations. In support of this theory, 
greater fusion has been linked to higher avoidance (Blackledge & Hayes, 2001).  
This increase in believability likely strengthens the interpretation of the negative 
thoughts, increasing negative predictions of future performance. Similar to research on 
fusion, we hypothesize that increased believability of negative thoughts will be related to 
less willingness to repeat an anxiety provoking situation.  
 
Willingness to Engage in Future Situations 
 In the present study, “willingness” refers to how disposed the individual is to 
repeat the speech task. This measure attempts to model likeliness of future avoidance or 
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approaching of social interactions. Willingness can be compared theoretically to both 
experiential (attempting to escape, avoid, alter, or conceal undesirable emotions and 
thoughts; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996) and behavioral avoidance. 
Research suggests that there is greater experiential avoidance in individuals with SAD 
compared to non-anxious controls (Heuer, Rink, & Becker, 2007; Kashdan et al., 2013). 
Addressing and reducing experiential avoidance is a focus of many behavioral therapies 
including acceptance and commitment therapy (Hayes & Wilson, 1994) and dialectical 
behavior therapy (Linehan, 1994). Though research has yet to explore the relationship 
between experiential avoidance and SAD in depth, treatment research suggests that 
addressing it might be a key mechanism of change (Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007). 
Similarly, greater behavioral avoidance has been associated with greater SAD 
symptomology (Moitra, Herbert & Forman, 2008). Conceptually, as mentioned above, 
we also see willingness as similar to behavioral avoidance. For example, someone with 
high anxiety surrounding class presentations would likely want to avoid class 
presentations and would therefore score low on willingness to repeat a presentation 
directly after giving one. Without this willingness to engage in feared situations and the 
therapy that follows, individuals remain in the cycle of anxiety, likely with stable or 
worsening symptoms.  
Adding willingness to the model, we hypothesize that experiencing a higher level 
of negative thoughts and believability of those thoughts would be linked to lower 
willingness to engage in similar situations in the future. This is similar, theoretically to 
operant conditioning, where individuals are less likely to repeat negative experiences 
(Skinner, 1937). With operant conditioning in mind, it makes sense that individuals with 
	     12 
SAD engage in behavioral avoidance of social situations that previously left them feeling 
humiliation, failure, and rejection.  
As mentioned above, fears and anxiety related to social experiences is a 
normative experience. However, we hypothesize that individuals without SAD will have 
higher willingness to repeat anxiety-provoking situations. Being willing to engage in 
anxiety provoking situations allows individuals to actually engage in the situations and 
experience outcomes, both positive and negative, and thus, have a broader set of 
expectancies of future events. This is likely also corroborated by the aforementioned 
fewer negative thoughts and reduced believability of them experienced by individuals 
without SAD. 
 
The Filter: Potential Adaptive Strategies 
Recent studies have found evidence that maladaptive cognitive processes are core 
mechanisms that perpetuate SAD (Kiko et al., 2012). However, less is known about 
adaptive strategies that may protect individuals from the consequences of having 
negative thoughts. Adaptive cognitive strategies might act as filters to interpret social and 
performance situations more broadly, considering both negative and positive evidence. 
This “filter” may then lead to individuals anticipating future situations to have both 
positive and negative aspects, increasing willingness to engage in future situations, thus 
protecting them from developing debilitating social anxiety. As described below, one of 
these adaptive strategies may be decentering, or the process of seeing thoughts or feelings 
as objective events in the mind rather than personally identifying with them (Safran & 
Segal, 1990). 
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Decentering may reduce the perceived likelihood of negative social cost 
experienced by individuals with SAD. Models of SAD suggest that individuals with SAD 
view social events (and predicted failures) as more “costly” than their NAC counterparts 
(Butler & Matthews, 1993; Foa & Kozak, 1985). In fact, experimental models suggest 
that reducing cost-estimates of social events increases improvement of individuals with 
SAD, even without adjusting for likelihood of future negative social events (Foa et al., 
1996; Uren, Szabo ́, & Lovibond, 2004). Thus, symptoms decrease when individuals 
place less value on poor social performance, even if they still predicted that future events 
would be negative. Attributing less cost to one’s performance likely takes off some 
cognitive “weight”, decreasing the cognitive symptoms of anxiety. These findings 
suggest that stepping back and evaluating potential costs from a more broadened (and 
adaptive) perspective may lead to lower SAD symptomology by reducing the cost 
associated with performance.  
This concept of “stepping back” can be thought of in the context of the cognitive 
process decentering. Decentering has been shown as a potential change agent of cognitive 
behavioral therapy (CBT) (Fresco et al., 2007) and may interrupt the negative feedback 
loop that perpetuates and exacerbates anxiety (Hayes-Skelton & Graham, 2012). 
Recently, Hayes-Skelton and Graham (2012) investigated whether decentering 
contributed to cognitive reappraisal, a link hypothesized by others (Ingram & Hollon, 
1986). Results suggested that decentering accounts for a large portion of the relationship 
between cognitive reappraisal and social anxiety, suggesting that it may be an adaptive 
cognitive tool for coping with the negative thoughts following social and performance 
events. As mentioned above, both individuals with and without SAD experience negative 
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thoughts during social interactions, but individuals with SAD focus mainly on the 
negative. Since decentering has been observed to have a negative correlation with SAD 
symptoms (Hayes-Skelton & Graham, 2012), we hypothesized that decentering may be a 
tool that allows individuals without SAD to view a social situation from a more 
broadened perspective, considering both positive and negative cues. This adaptive 
cognitive strategy may lead to fewer negative thoughts overall, and, in turn, less negative 
predictions for future events. Having a less negative prediction for future events then 
leads the individual to view social interactions as less threatening, again allowing them to 
view the next event with a more broadened, or decentered perspective. With this less 
negative perspective in mind, individuals might be more willing to engage in similar 
situations in the future.   
In summary, the literature has found that both the situational (during event) and 
expanded (pre, during and post event processing) negative feedback loops are associated 
with SAD symptoms and severity. We are interested in learning more about negative 
thoughts in multiple parts of the expanded loop and potential adaptive strategies that can 
be used to interrupt the negative nature of the cycle in individuals with SAD, increasing 
their willingness to engage in future social interactions. 
 
Current Study 
 The present study investigated multiple parts of the aforementioned feedback loop 
(see Figure 1), specifically whether there are differences between those with and without 
clinically significant anxiety on measures of the number of negative thoughts 
experienced, willingness to engage, believability of negative thoughts, and decentering 
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surrounding an anxiety-provoking speaking task. We investigated this experimentally 
using a speech task, as it is typical for individuals with and without SAD to experience 
negative self-evaluative thoughts during public speaking tasks (Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, 
Williams, & Morrison, 2006). We hypothesized that, consistent with previous research, 
following the speech task individuals with SAD would report higher levels of negative 
thoughts experienced during the task, higher believability of those thoughts, and lower 
trait levels of decentering than those in the NAC group.  
Additionally, we investigated whether or not believability and decentering moderated 
the negative feedback loop of negative thoughts and avoidance. Measures of this 
relationship included trait decentering, anticipatory and during-task anxiety, post-event 
negative thoughts and believability, and willingness to repeat a speech task. Each of these 
measures gave us information about the individual’s experience of each part of the loop 
(pre, during, and post event). The willingness measure was used as a tool to simulate 
prediction of engagement in future events (high willingness suggesting a more positive 
prediction of engaging in future speeches, and low suggesting a more negative 
prediction). Collapsing the two groups together, we hypothesized that there would be an 
inverse relationship between the amount of negative thoughts and willingness to repeat 
the task and that decentering and believability would moderate this relationship, in that 
when low levels of decentering and/or high believability were reported there would be a 
stronger association between negative thoughts and willingness, whereas in high levels of 
decentering and/or low believability the relationship would be weakened or absent. 
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Figure 1.  
Hypothesized relationship between anxiety, decentering, believability, and willingness in 
NAC and SAD groups 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
  
 
 
Participants 
The sample was composed of 60 individuals (30 NAC, 30 SAD). All participants 
(38 females 63.2%, 22 males 36.7%) were cis-gendered, meaning their gender identity 
matched their biological sex. For sexual orientation, 80.0% identified as Heterosexual 
(n=48), 8.3% as Bisexual (n=5), 10.0% as Gay/Lesbian (n=6), and 1.7% as “Other” 
(n=1). Of the sample, 47.5% identified as White (n=28), 18.6% as Asian (n=11), 15.3% 
as Black (n=9), 10.2% as Latino/a Non-white (n=6), 8.5% as Latino/a White (n=5), 5.1% 
as Other (n=3), 3.4% as Multiracial (n=2), 3.4% as Middle Eastern (n=2), and 1.7% as 
Nipmuc (n=1). Ages ranged from 18-55 (M=26.70, SD= 8.90). Highest level of education 
attained for the sample was as follows, 3.4% high school diploma (n=2), 1.7% vocational 
school/other non-college (n=1), 57.5% 1-3 years of college (n=34), 25.4% college degree 
(n=15), 11.9% master’s degree (n=7), 1.7% did not respond (n=1). 
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Screening  
Inclusion criteria for both groups included English fluency (with at least 3 years 
speaking English) and willingness to have assessments video recorded. Exclusionary 
criteria for both groups included a diagnosis of obsessive compulsive disorder (n=6) 
autism-spectrum disorders (n=1), bipolar disorder (n=1), or substance dependence (n=8). 
Participants were also excluded if they exhibited symptoms that required immediate 
attention (such as psychotic symptoms (n=0) or suicidal intent (n=0)). 
Participants with Social Anxiety Disorder 
When participants contacted the study in response to advertisements for 
treatment-seeking individuals with symptoms of social anxiety, they were first asked to 
complete a phone screen to determine whether they met initial inclusion/exclusion 
criteria. This included an initial screen of social anxiety symptoms based on the four 
questions from the social phobia section of the Mini International Neuropsychiatric 
Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 2006). The MINI shows satisfactory inter-rater 
reliability (0.67-0.85), and good correlation with expert diagnoses with kappa values 
above 0.88 (Mukhtar et al., 2012). The MINI was followed by questions regarding other 
related disorders, any current psychotropic medication use, any other current therapy. 
Current therapy and use of psychotropic medications were not exclusionary for the SAD 
group. 
Non-anxious Control Participants 
Participants who responded to advertisements for a study about “social 
interactions and experiences” completed an online questionnaire (5-15 minutes) that 
assessed anxiety and depression levels using the Social Interaction Anxiety-Short-6, 
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Social Phobia Scale-6 (SIAS-6 & SPS-6; Peters, Sunderland, Andrews, Rapee, & 
Mattick, 2012) and Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21; Henry & 
Crawford, 2005). Psychometric properties for the SIAS and SPS show good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α ranging from .88-.94) and moderate to strong convergent 
validity with correlations ranging from .53-.77 (Hughes et al., 2006; Mattick & Clarke, 
1998). For the DASS, studies show internal consistency ranging from .81-.97  
(McDowell, 2006), test-retest reliability between .71 and .81 (Brown, Chorpita, 
Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997), good convergent validity, r’s -.58 to -.69 and divergent 
validity, r’s -.16 to -.34 (Sinclair et al., 2012). Individuals who scored low on these 
anxiety and depression measures (indicating that they likely did not have a clinically 
significant anxiety or depressive disorder) were contacted to complete a phone screen and 
ADIS-IV assessment to verify that they qualified. Cutoffs used for this sample were 
based on selecting for participants without significant anxiety or depressive disorders. 
Suggested cutoffs for each scale corresponded to an absence of symptoms. However, 
these cutoffs only qualified a very small percentage of participants so cutoffs were 
adjusted slightly and were as follows: SIAS-6: less than 18 out of 36 SPS-6: less than 9 
out of 36; DASS-21 Depression less than 13 out of 42 (none-mild), Anxiety less than 11 
out of 42 (none-low moderate), Stress less than 18 out of 42 (none-mild). The phone 
screen included the MINI to screen out individuals with SAD, diagnosed anxiety 
spectrum disorders, autism spectrum disorders, current psychotropic medication use, and 
asked about any current therapy.  
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Diagnostic Interview 
After the phone screen, all qualified participants were scheduled for a diagnostic 
assessment using the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; 
Figure 2-a; Brown, DiNardo & Barlow, 1994). Assessors were either a licensed clinical 
psychologist or graduate students under the supervision of a licensed clinical 
psychologist. The ADIS-IV is a semi-structured diagnostic interview designed to assess 
the presence, nature, and severity of DSM-IV anxiety, mood, and somatoform disorders. 
The interview also contains a simple screen for alcohol and substance abuse and for 
psychotic symptoms. After the ADIS-IV, a team of assessors verified diagnoses, reaching 
consensus on a subjective rating quantifying all clinically significant and subclinical 
symptoms endorsed.  This rating, called the Clinician Severity Rating (CSR), ranges from 
0 (not at all severe) to 8 (extremely severe/distressing). Inclusion criteria for the SAD 
group was a primary diagnosis of SAD with a Clinician Severity Rating (CSR) of at least 
4 (moderate impairment, the cut-off for a disorder of clinical significance; Brown et al., 
1994; Heimberg et al., 1990). Co-occurring diagnoses were allowed in the SAD group, as 
long as SAD was primary. For the NAC group, a CSR greater than 2 (mild, non-
interfering symptoms) of any anxiety or mood disorder was exclusionary.  
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Figure 2.  
Order of study assessments and administration of questionnaires 
  Visit 1      Post Visit 1        Visit 2-During Task        Directly After Task 
 
 
 Part a          Part b       Part c            Part d  
 
Procedure 
Once exclusion/inclusion criteria based on the ADIS-IV were assessed, 
participants who qualified were asked to complete questionnaires (Figure 2-b) and were 
scheduled for the Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT) assessment. The questionnaire 
packet included the Experiences Questionnaire (described below), the trait-level 
decentering measure used in this study. In a BAT assessment (Figure 2-c), participants 
are asked to engage in potentially anxiety-provoking situations in order to provide a 
behavioral assessment of anxiety. For this assessment, participants were asked to role-
play an impromptu speech to an audience of one study confederate and a video camera. 
Though these BATs also included a brief social interaction, the speech task was selected 
for this study because it has been shown to elicit more anxiety in both SAD and NAC 
groups (Kiko et al., 2012). The confederate (audience) was instructed to keep a neutral 
expression throughout the task and to not give any feedback, positive or negative. There 
are two phases to the BAT: an anticipatory phase and a performance phase. The 
anticipatory phase lasts 2.5 minutes and consists of the time from when participants first 
learn that they are going to give a speech until the time when participants are ready to 
ADIS-­‐IV	   EQ	   BAT	   SCQ	  Willingness	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begin the role-play. The performance phase lasts 4 minutes and begins when participants 
enter the role-play situation. The role-players were either graduate students or 
undergraduate research assistants working on this study. Negative thoughts were 
measured directly after the task using the Social Cognition Questionnaire (SCQ) a 
measure asking participants to rate the negative thoughts that they experienced during the 
task, as well as the believability of those thoughts (Wells et al., 1993). Finally, we 
measured willingness by asking participants to rate how willing they were to repeat the 
task (Figure 2-d). 
 
Assessment Measures  
Decentering. The Experiences Questionnaire-decentering factor (EQ: Fresco et 
al., 2007) was administered between the ADIS assessment and speech task visit (within 
approximately 2 weeks of the task) as a trait measure of decentering. The 11-item 
decentering factor of the EQ was designed as a self-report measure to specifically assess 
decentering. Participants are asked to rate how often (never, rarely, sometimes, often, all 
of the time) they have experiences like “I remind myself that my thoughts aren’t facts,” 
and “I can separate myself from my thoughts and feelings” using a 5-point Likert scale. 
This measure has shown good psychometric properties with an internal consistency of 
α =.83, significant convergent correlations with similar constructs, and negative 
correlations with contrasting constructs like rumination and experiential avoidance 
(Fresco et al., 2007). The internal consistency for current sample was acceptable 
(Cronbach’s α  = .78). 
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Negative Thoughts and Believability. The Social Cognition Questionnaire (SCQ: 
Wells et al., 1993) lists 22 thoughts that individuals with SAD often experience (i.e., 
people think I’m boring; people will see I am nervous; I will be unable to speak), and was 
administered following the speech task. For each thought, the SCQ asks respondents to 
indicate how often the thought occurred explicitly during the speech task on a scale of 1 
(thought never occurred) to 5 (thought always occurs when I am nervous). If the thought 
did occur, they are asked to rate how believable the thought was to them on a scale of 0 (I 
do not believe this thought) to 100 (I am completely convinced this thought is true). For 
our analyses, we created a sum score for the negative thoughts and believability scales 
separately. For participants missing data, we performed a mean replacement if 
participants had less than 20% of items data. No participant in the present study was 
missing more than 20% of the items on this measure. The SCQ has shown high internal 
consistency and reliability (Kiko et al., 2012; Stopa, 1995), and differentiates between 
low and high anxious individuals (Tanner et al., 2006). The internal consistency for 
current sample was excellent (negative thoughts Cronbach’s α  = .95).  
Willingness. Participants were asked to complete a measure of willingness 
following the speech task, asking, “If you were asked to repeat the speech task right now, 
how willing would you be to complete it?” Participants were asked to rate their 
willingness on a 0 to 100 scale.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
Skew values for each of the measures (negative thoughts, believability, 
decentering, willingness) were within acceptable limits, ranging from 0.29-0.75, and 
Kurtosis values ranged from 0.12-1.50. We performed preliminary analyses using chi-
squared tests and t-tests to investigate potential differences between the SAD and NAC 
groups on demographic variables. The tests revealed that the groups did not significantly 
differ on race/ethnicity, biological sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, or age (see 
Table 1). We checked for differences between minority and non-minority groups on the 
measures of interest (frequency of negative thoughts, believability, decentering, and 
willingness). Collapsing the SAD and NAC groups together, there were no significant 
differences between males and females (p’s ranged from .32-.85) or between individuals 
that did or did not identify with a marginalized sexual orientation (p’s ranged from .29-
.97) on the measures of interest (listed above). White and non-White participants also did 
not differ significantly on these measures (p’s ranged from .64-.87). However, there was 
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a trend in that Non-white participants rated greater frequency (p=.06) and believability 
(p=.06) of negative thoughts. 
Table 1.  
Comparison of demographic characteristics between the socially 
anxious and non-anxious control groups 
   
 SAD NAC Total    
  n=30 (%) n=30 (%) N=60 (%) p     χ2  
Biological 
Sex/Gendera 
      1.00 0.00  
Female 19 (63.3) 19 (63.3) 38 (63.3)    
Male 11 (36.7) 11 (36.7) 22 (36.7)  
 
  
Sexual Orientation       .75 1.20  
Heterosexual 24 (80.0) 24 (80.0) 48 (80.0)    
Gay/Lesbian 3 (10.0) 3 (10.0) 6 (10.0)    
Bisexual 2 (6.7) 3 (10.0) 5 (8.3)    
Other 1 (3.3) 0 -- 1 (1.7)    
          
Race/Ethnicityb          
White 16 (53.3) 15 (50.0) 28 (47.5) .90 0.02  
Asian 6 (20.0) 5 (16.7) 11 (18.6) .79 0.07  
Black 5 (16.7) 4 (13.8) 9 (15.3) .76 0.09  
Latino/a Non-
White 
3 (10.0) 3 (10.3) 6 (10.2) .97 0.00  
Latino/a White 
Middle Eastern 
2 
0 
(6.7) 
-- 
3 
2 
(10.3) 
(6.7) 
5 
2 
(8.5) 
(3.4) 
.61 
.08 
0.26 
3.00 
 
Multiracial/multi-
ethnic 
Alaskan Native, 
Native American, 
or Indegenous 
Pacific Islander, 
Native Hawaiian 
Other 
2 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
3 
(6.7) 
 
(3.3) 
 
-- 
 
 
(10.0) 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0  
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
2 
 
1  
 
 
0 
 
 
3 
(3.4) 
 
(1.7) 
 
-- 
 
 
(5.1) 
.08 
 
.32 
 
 
-- 
 
 
.08 
3.00 
 
.98 
 
-- 
 
 
4.95 
 
    M (SD)    M (SD)    M (SD)    
Age (in years) 27.30 (9.58) 26.07 (8.30) 26.68 (8.91) 0.60   
aBiological Sex and Gender were combined since all participants were cis-gendered 
bParticipants were given the option to select each race that was applicable 
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Hypotheses 1a-2b: Between Group Comparisons on Decentering, Negative Thoughts, 
Believability, and Willingness 
 A series of one-way ANOVAs were run to investigate differences between the 
SAD and NAC groups on measures of trait decentering, frequency of negative thoughts 
and believability, and willingness to repeat an anxiety-provoking task (Table 2). As 
hypothesized, the NAC group reported a significantly lower number of negative thoughts 
(M=29.92, SD=5.93) than the SAD group (M=61.03, SD=18.48) [F(1, 58)=77.09, 
p<.001] during the speech task. In addition, the NAC group reported significantly lower 
believability scores (M=703.54, SD=503.50) than those with SAD (M=1360.29, 
SD=580.65) [F(1, 57)=21.59, p<.001]. The NAC group reported a significantly greater 
willingness to complete the task (M=66.83, SD=27.12) than the SAD group (M=37.00, 
SD=31.75) [F(1, 58)=15.32, p<.001]. Finally, participants without social anxiety had 
significantly higher scores of trait decentering (M=46.34, SD=8.38) than those with SAD 
(M=35.92, SD=6.57) [F(1, 58)=, p<.001]. 
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Table 2. 
T-test results comparing socially anxious and non-anxious control groups on Frequency of 
Negative Thoughts, Believability of Thoughts, Trait decentering, Willingness to complete task, and 
Clinical Severity Ratings 
 SAD NAC   
N=60 M (SD) 
n=30 
M (SD) 
n=30 
     t df  p (2-tailed) 
 
 
SCQ         
Freq. Negative 
Thoughts 
61.03 (18.48) 29.92 (5.93) 77.09 58 <0.001  
Believability of 
Negative 
Thoughts 
1360.29 (580.65) 703.54 (503.50) 21.59 57 <0.001  
Trait decentering 35.92 (6.57) 46.34 (8.38) 28.79 58 <0.001  
Willingness 37.00 (31.75) 66.83 (27.12) 15.32 58 <0.001  
 Note: SAD= Social Anxiety Disorder; NAC= Non-Anxious Controls; SCQ=Social Cognitions 
Questionnaire 
 
Hypotheses 3a-3b: Moderation Analyses 
 To test the hypothesis that the frequency of negative thoughts is associated with 
willingness, and more specifically that decentering moderates the relationship between 
the frequency of negative thoughts and willingness (hypothesis 3a), a hierarchical 
multiple regression was conducted. First, we tested the relationship between negative 
thoughts, decentering, and willingness by performing correlation analyses (summarized 
in Table 3). Frequency of negative thoughts was strongly negatively correlated with 
willingness, in that a higher frequency of negative thoughts was correlated with lower 
willingness to repeat the task. Decentering was moderately positively correlated with 
willingness in that higher trait level decentering was correlated with greater willingness 
to repeat the task. Finally, there was a strong negative correlation between negative 
thoughts and decentering, in that higher decentering was correlated with lower frequency 
of negative thoughts.  
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Table 3.  
Summary Statistics and correlations for hypothesis 3a 
Weight 
Variable Negative Thoughts Believability Willingness Decentering   
Negative  
Thoughts  --                     
Believability           .79**          --              
Willingness            -.63**       -.63**         --          
Decentering          -.51**       -.47**        .35**         --  
M (SD)       45.47 (20.77)         1026.35 (631.81)   51.92 (32.91)      41.13 (9.13) 
**Correlation is significant at the p<0.01 level 
 
Next, a multiple regression model looking at negative thoughts and decentering 
with willingness as a criterion produced the following results: R2=.40, F(2, 57)=18.73, 
p<.001, negative thoughts (b=-0.61, p<.001), decentering (b=0.04, p=.73), further detail 
in Table 4. The multiple regression results indicated that negative thoughts and 
decentering accounted for 40% of the variance in willingness. As can be seen, frequency 
of negative thoughts was significantly associated with the criterion (willingness) while 
controlling for decentering. However, decentering was not a significant unique predictor 
of willingness and did not account for additional unique variance when frequency of 
negative thoughts was in the model. This suggests that the association between 
decentering and willingness (shown in the bivariate correlation) is accounted for by the 
shared variance with the frequency of negative thoughts. Next, the interaction term 
between negative thoughts and decentering was added to the regression model as a 
second step. The interaction term did not account for a significant amount of the variance 
in willingness over and above the two indicators, ΔR2=.000, ΔF(1, 56)=.026, p=.87, b=-
0.02, negative thoughts (b=-0.61, p<.001), decentering (b=0.03, p=.79), negative thoughts 
* decentering (b=-0.02, p=.87). Adding decentering as a moderator, negative thoughts 
continued to contribute to the model, and decentering continued to not contribute to the 
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model. The moderator did not contribute significantly, indicating that this measure of 
trait-level decentering is not a moderator of the relationship between negative thoughts 
and willingness in our sample.  
Table 4.  
Analysis investigating hypothesis 3a: Decentering as a moderator of the relationship 
between negative thoughts and willingness 
Variable R2   b  SE   β R2Δ        p 
Step 1  .40       .40 <.001 
Negative  
Thoughts   -0.96  .19  -.61  <.001 
Decentering   0.15  .43  .04  .73 
 
Step 2  .40       .00 .87 
Negative  
Thoughts   -0.97  .20  -.61  <.001 
Decentering   0.12  .47  -.03  .79   
Neg*Dec   -0.00  .02  -.02  .87 
Note: Neg*Dec = the interaction term of negative thoughts and decentering 
 
To test the hypothesis that the frequency of negative thoughts is associated with 
willingness, and more specifically that believability of the thoughts moderates the 
relationship between negative thoughts and willingness (hypothesis 3b), a hierarchical 
multiple regression was conducted. First, we tested the relationship between negative 
thoughts, believability and willingness by performing correlation analyses (Table 3). 
Frequency of negative thoughts and believability of them were both strongly negatively 
correlated with willingness, in that a higher frequency of negative thoughts and 
believability of them were (independently) correlated with lower willingness to repeat the 
task. Negative thoughts and believability were very strongly positively correlated in that 
higher frequency of negative thoughts was correlated with greater believability of the 
thoughts. 
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Next, a multiple regression model looking at negative thoughts and believability 
with willingness as a criterion produced the following results: R2=.47, F(2, 56)=24.79, 
p<.001, negative thoughts (b=-0.46, p=.005), believability (b=-0.26, p=.11), further detail 
in Table 5. The multiple regression results indicated that negative thoughts and 
believability accounted for 47% of the variance in willingness. As can be seen, frequency 
of negative thoughts was significantly associated with the criterion (willingness) while 
controlling for believability. Similar to the results for hypothesis 3a, despite the high 
correlation between believability and willingness, believability was not a significant 
predictor of willingness (did not account for additional unique variance) when negative 
thoughts was in the model. Next, the interaction term between negative thoughts and 
believability was added to the regression model. The interaction term did not account for 
a significant portion of the variance in willingness over and above the indicators, 
ΔR2=.001, ΔF(1, 55)=0.06, p=.80, b=0.03, negative thoughts (b=-0.49, p=.02), 
believability (b=-0.24, p=.19), negative thoughts * believability (b=0.03, p=.80). Adding 
believability as a moderator, negative thoughts continued to contribute to the model, and 
believability continued to not contribute. The indicator did not contribute significantly, 
indicating that believability of negative thoughts experienced during the task is not a 
moderator of the relationship between negative thoughts and willingness in this sample. 
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Table 5.  
Analysis investigating hypothesis 3b: Believability as a moderator of the relationship 
between negative thoughts and willingness 
Variable R2   b  SE   β R2Δ        p 
Step 1  .47       .47 <.001 
Negative  
Thoughts   -0.72  .25  -.46  .005 
Believability   -0.01  .01  -.26  .11 
 
Step 2  .47       .00 .80 
Negative  
Thoughts   -0.77  .32  -.49  .02 
Believability   -0.01  .01  -.24  .19  
Neg*Bel   -0.00  .00  .03  .80 
Note: Neg*Bel = the interaction term of negative thoughts and believability 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 The present study investigated cognitive processes comprising a proposed SAD-
sustaining feedback loop. Following an anxiety-provoking 4-minute speech task, 
individuals with SAD were compared to NAC participants on measures of negative 
thought prevalence, their believability of the negative thoughts, decentering, and 
willingness to repeat the task. This study provides supporting evidence for negative 
feedback loops used in models of SAD and contributes to our understanding of 
differences in how SAD and NAC individuals engage in an anxiety-provoking social 
task. Our hypothesized loop was supported in that there were differences at each step of 
the model between SAD and NAC. However, our hypothesized moderators (decentering 
and believability) between negative thoughts and willingness were not supported by the 
data. 
 As hypothesized, individuals with SAD reported a higher frequency of negative 
thoughts during the speech task. Individuals with SAD rated these negative thoughts as 
more believable than NACs. Greater prevalence and believability of negative thoughts in 
the SAD group is consistent with prior research (Hirsch et al., 2006; Tanner et al., 2006) 
and suggests that individuals with SAD encode more negative evidence of self-
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performance during a social situation. This increased quantity and believability of 
negative thoughts is consistent with models of SAD that suggest a negative feedback loop 
sustains SAD symptomology (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Individuals with SAD focus 
more on negative cues and thoughts (Alden, et al., 2008), likely because they are having 
an anxious response and finding the environment threatening (Gilbert, 2001). Finding 
self-critical negative thoughts more believable may lead to a more critical and negative 
self-perception. This negative evaluation of one’s ongoing performance may lead to 
greater anxiety in current and future social interactions (Laposa et al., 2010). The 
increased negativity and anxiety then fuel predictions of future events (and likely lead to 
greater avoidance), completing the negative feedback loop.   
NACs were more willing to repeat the speech task than individuals with SAD. We 
used willingness as a proxy for avoidance, an important maintaining symptom of SAD 
whereby individuals avoid anxiety-provoking situations (Clark & Wells, 1995; Herbert & 
Cardaciotto, 2005; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). As expected, the SAD group indicated 
significantly lower willingness to repeat the speech task, likely reflecting that they think 
future interactions would be less successful than NACs would predict. Building on the 
findings with negative thoughts and believability, and considering the SAD loop, 
individuals who interpret a social situation as more negative will likely also assume that 
future events will also go negatively (not measured in this study), and will be more likely 
to engage in avoidance of similar situations in the future to avoid feelings of anxiety (i.e. 
less willing).  
Individuals in the NAC group reported higher trait-level decentering than 
individuals with SAD. Higher levels of trait decentering, an adaptive cognitive strategy 
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(Fresco et al., 2007), in NACs suggests that individuals without anxiety disorders are 
more often cognitively “stepping back” from the anxiety-provoking situation (Safren & 
Segal, 1990), and examining their own thoughts, allowing them to take in a wider range 
of cues from their environment, including positive, neutral, and negative. Indeed, in 
previous research NACs have been shown to find anxiety-provoking social situations 4 
times less negative than individuals with SAD (Stopa & Clark, 1993). Having a more 
rounded, less rigid interpretation of a social performance situation might protect 
individuals from developing a clinically significant fear of social situations, or SAD. 
In sum, significant mean differences were found at each step of the negative 
feedback loop proposed: negative thoughts, believability, decentering, and willingness. 
These findings support the hypothesis that NAC and SAD individuals experience 
anxiety-provoking situations differently, and that there may be places in the model where 
differences characterize either group. However, further research is needed to look at the 
causal associations between these (and perhaps additional) steps.   
We collapsed the SAD and NAC groups together to perform correlational and 
moderation analyses to test the hypothesis that regardless of the number of negative 
thoughts experienced, different levels of adaptive cognitions (decentering and 
believability) would determine the willingness of participants to repeat the task. By 
investigating this, we hoped to gain a better understanding of how the conclusions that 
are made by individuals following anxiety-provoking situations affect future engagement 
or avoidance, a key part of SAD models (Clark & Wells, 1995; Moitra, Herbert, & 
Forman, 2008; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Negative thoughts were inversely correlated 
with willingness, in that a higher frequency of negative thoughts was associated with 
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lower willingness to repeat the task. This is consistent with our theorized loop, as the 
more negative self-evaluative cognitions one has about their performance, the less likely 
they are to want to repeat the experience. Believability was very strongly correlated with 
frequency of negative thoughts, likely because they are two parts of the same measure 
answered in succession and because the more negative thoughts one has about a situation, 
the more likely one is to believe those negative thoughts. Decentering was moderately 
positively correlated with willingness in that higher levels of decentering were related to 
higher willingness to repeat the task. Since NACs also experience negative thoughts in 
speech tasks (Hirsch et al., 2006), we hypothesized that they might be using adaptive 
cognitive strategies (like decentering) to cope with the anxiety and leave with a less 
negative overall perception of the task and thus, more willing to repeat it. Finally, 
decentering and believability were highly correlated with each other, in that higher 
decentering was related to lower believability. This is consistent with our 
conceptualization of each, as we see decentering and believability as related constructs. 
Decentering is described as stepping back from one’s thoughts and seeing them more 
objectively, more like experiences and less like fact (Safran & Segal, 1990). Similarly, 
one can have a negative self-critical thought like “I won’t have anything to say,” but not 
encode it as fact, and in turn find it less believable. Though we did expect relationships 
between variables, it is possible that the high correlations between the two sets of 
predictors (negative thoughts and decentering; negative thoughts and believability) has 
resulted in multicolinearity among the variables, which may be interfering with the 
moderation analyses.   
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Though decentering and willingness were correlated, decentering was not a 
unique predictor of willingness in the initial regression model when frequency of 
negative thoughts was also included. This lack of an evidenced relationship between 
decentering and willingness while controlling for negative thoughts is puzzling, as NAC 
had higher levels of trait decentering, and it is a proposed mechanism of change in CBT 
techniques (Hayes-Skelton & Graham, 2012). This lack of findings may be due to the 
aforementioned effects of multicolinearity, in that frequency of negative thoughts 
explained the shared variance between decentering and willingness. Another possibility is 
that frequency of negative thoughts drove the relationship so strongly that it prevented 
decentering from being able to add unique variance. It is also possible that the EQ does 
not capture the complex cognitive process of decentering in the way we theorize it 
interacting with this feedback loop. Because the EQ is a trait measure of decentering (and 
was administered up to 2 weeks before the speech task) we might not be capturing how 
decentering interacts with one’s anxiety during a task. 
In the second regression model looking at the relationship between negative 
thoughts and believability with willingness as a criterion, believability did not 
significantly contribute to the model over and above frequency of negative thoughts. This 
finding is likely due to the very high correlation between frequency of negative thoughts 
and believability, as they are two parts of the same measure (answered in succession). 
This high correlation might be because the measures are too similar for one to possibly 
add unique variance to a model including both. Further, the high correlation might 
indicate that the measure does not adequately discriminate between these two constructs 
that we theorize as more distinct than the data imply.  
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Indeed, moderation analyses did not reveal evidence for decentering or 
believability moderating the relationship between the frequency of negative thoughts and 
participants’ willingness to repeat the task. Since decentering is a potential mechanism of 
change in cognitive behavioral therapies for anxiety disorders (Hayes-Skelton & Graham, 
2012), we expected that it might explain how individuals could be willing to repeat an 
anxiety-provoking situation, despite experiencing negative thoughts. Our lack of findings 
in these moderation analyses suggests that we do not yet fully understand decentering, 
how it might be related to believability, and how both interact in the cognitive processes 
of individuals with and without anxiety disorders. Further, these results might suggest 
that a measure of trait-level decentering might not be the ideal measure of an adaptive 
cognitive strategy employed in the midst of an anxiety-provoking social situation. 
Instead, a state-level measure of decentering might be more fitting for our model. In 
terms of believability, this variable likely would have been much stronger if separate 
from frequency of negative thoughts. Because these two were so highly correlated, 
unique effects of believability and how it relates to willingness could not be measured.  
Taken together, these results partially support models of SAD which suggest that 
negative feedback loops exacerbate and perpetuate symptoms of social anxiety, as NAC 
and SAD individuals differed significantly in each step of the process we examined 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). During an anxiety-provoking situation, 
individuals with SAD experience more negative thoughts about the event and their 
performance, and also find those thoughts more believable. Willingness can be thought of 
as a proxy of future avoidance, in that being less willing to repeat the task is likely related 
to how the individual predicts future situations will go, and how likely they would be to 
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engage in them. Avoidance (or being un-“willing” to engage in a social situation) is 
correlated with greater SAD symptomatology (Moitra, Herbert, & Forman, 2008) and 
may perpetuate symptoms by preventing individuals from engaging in positive social 
interactions. Decentering has been proposed to be a potential mechanism of change in 
CBT treatments for SAD (Fresco, et al., 2007; Hayes-Skelton & Graham, 2012) and the 
present study supports that decentering is a key component in the distinction between 
individuals with and without anxiety disorders, at a trait level. Lack of findings in our 
moderation analyses indicate that future research is needed to understand how 
decentering interacts with anxiety and negative cognitions, as we have seen that 
individuals without anxiety disorders have higher levels of this adaptive cognitive 
strategy. Trait-level decentering was not uniquely related to willingness to repeat the task 
over and above the frequency of negative thoughts. Perhaps trait-level decentering is 
more related to how much anxiety is experienced by the participant in the anxiety-
provoking situation on either physiological or self-report measures. Future studies could 
employ a state measure of decentering during the task to better measure this complex 
construct in the way we are theorizing it to interact with negative cognitions in the midst 
of an anxiety-provoking situation. 
 The findings of this study should be considered in the context of a few limitations. 
These data were collected cross-sectionally, so conclusions about directionality cannot be 
made. Often  studies investigating BATs in social anxiety control for gender sameness or 
difference between the participant and confederate as a proxy of attraction, as it may play 
a role in the difficulty of the task. However, we did not control for this due to varying 
sexual orientation identification of our participants, and a lack of an alternative strong 
	     39 
measure of attraction. Not measuring attraction prevented us from controlling for this 
factor of our participants’ experiences. Additionally, the “willingness” measure is 
relatively new and only a single item. Further investigation of the link between 
willingness and future social avoidance would make an important connection and allow 
for further insight into the negative feedback loop that we believe exacerbates anxiety. 
Also, we assessed trait decentering 1-2 weeks before the BAT, rather than measuring 
state decentering at the same time point as the task. This trait measure of decentering 
collected at a different time point might have prevented us from seeing the full effects of 
decentering employed during the speech task. Future studies should consider measuring 
trait decentering at the same time point, or perhaps measuring state decentering before or 
after the task. Ideally, a “live” measure of decentering would be created that would 
enable measurement of decentering at baseline and during anxiety provoking situations in 
individuals with and without anxiety to learn more about how this cognitive strategy 
works, and how it relates to anxiety. Learning more about how individuals experience, 
dispute, or relate to negative thoughts and the believability of them during anxiety-
provoking situations (as opposed to after) would aid in elucidating this anxiety loop on a 
macro level.  
Future empirical studies are necessary to explore this negative feedback loop 
model more fully, potentially using additional or different measures. First, models should 
be developed that use measures that are not as highly correlated as ones used in the 
present study, to avoid effects of multicollinearity in moderation analyses. Second, 
additional facets of the feedback loop surrounding anxiety-provoking situations should be 
considered and potentially added to the experimental model, such as level of anxiety 
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throughout the task. Ideally, a state, or “live” measure of decentering that more fully 
measures an individual’s relationship with negative thoughts during the task would be 
used. Also, future studies should consider other statistical models that might more 
accurately describe or further explore causal relationships. For example, investigating 
potential mediation effects of decentering would allow us to see if decentering is a step 
that individuals take in response to negative thoughts before perceptions about the 
believability or overall perception of the task are made.  
Gaining a greater understanding of the role of emotions and cognitions 
experienced and employed during anxiety provoking situations and further exploration of 
the cognitive processes that distinguish individuals with and without anxiety disorders is 
an important direction to explore in anxiety disorders. For example, including a post-
treatment SAD group in the data would allow us to investigate the relationship between 
decentering before and after treatment in anxious samples compared to those without 
anxiety disorders. Decentering could potentially be a byproduct of treatment over and 
above that which NAC have at a trait level. Understanding more about the difference 
between learned and trait decentering in post-treatment and NAC control samples would 
help elucidate this cognitive process and potential mechanism of change. Learning more 
about the cognitive factors that exacerbate or maintain anxiety symptoms will aid in the 
development of more efficacious and efficient treatments for anxiety disorders. 
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